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of non-traded goods and the nature of capital mobility between the traded and the non-
traded sectors in analyzing the consequences of liberalized investment policies on the 
relative wage inequality in the developing countries. The present paper purports to fill in 
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economy. We have found that inflows of foreign capital usually improve the wage 
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non-traded final commodity wage inequality worsens if the low-skill sector is capital-
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FOREIGN CAPITAL AND SKILLED-UNSKILLED WAGE INEQUALITY IN A 
DEVELOPING ECONOMY WITH NON-TRADED GOODS 
 
1. Introduction: 
 
Developing countries have chosen free trade as their development strategy and been 
vigorously implementing liberalized trade and investment policies for the last two 
decades or so. Radical measures for reducing tariff barriers and completely doing away 
with non-tariff barriers to ensure freer global trade have been undertaken in 
manufacturing commodities. FDI norms have liberalized considerably and several 
sectors, hitherto protected, have been opened up to foreign capitalists so that inflows of 
foreign capital take place in abundance in order to facilitate economic growth. It is 
important to mention that the developing countries have been able to attract a substantial 
amount of foreign capital during the period of economic reforms.1 
 
The new development approach has not so far been an unmixed blessing. In their 
endeavor in implementing liberalized economic policies the developing countries have 
been facing some adjustment costs. Increasing skilled-unskilled wage inequality2 and 
unemployment of unskilled labour are two major exacerbating problems of the 
developing world in the post-reform era. It is quite perplexing as to why the relative wage 
inequality has deteriorated, especially when as per the baseline 2×2×2 Heckscher-Ohlin-
Samuelson trade model, economic liberalization was expected to improve the wage 
inequality in the developing economies following increases in the prices of the export 
commodities as these are generally exporters of commodities that are intensive in the use 
of unskilled labour.  
                                                 
1 As per the UNCTAD (2005) report, FDI inflows to developing countries increased from 8,455 
millions of dollars in 1980 to 2,33,227 millions of dollars in 2004. FDI inward stocks in the 
corresponding years were 1,32,044 and 22,32,868 millions of dollars, respectively. 
 
2 See Robbins (1994, 1995, 1996), Wood (1997), Khan (1998) and Tendulkar et al. (1996) among 
others.  
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The scanty theoretical literature explaining the deteriorating wage inequality in the 
developing countries includes works of Feenstra and Hanson (1996), Yabuuchi and 
Chaudhuri (2007) and Marjit, Beladi and Chakrabarti (2004). They have shown how 
trade liberalization, international migration of labour and inflows of foreign capital might 
produce unfavourable effects on the wage inequality in the South given the specific 
structural characteristics of the less developed countries, such as features of labour 
markets, structures of production, nature of capital mobility etc. 
 
As per the empirical literature, growth in foreign direct investment which is positively 
correlated with the relative demand for skilled labour has been one of the prime factors3 
responsible for the growing incidence of wage inequality in the Southern countries. The 
paper of Feenstra and Hanson (1996) is based on the famous Dornbusch-Fischer-
Samuelson continuum-of-goods framework. According to them, inflows of foreign 
capital induced greater production of skilled-intensive commodities in Mexico, thereby 
leading to a relative decrease in the demand for unskilled labour. Marjit, Beladi and 
Chakrabarti (2004) have analyzed how diverse trade pattern and market fragmentation in 
world trade can adversely affect the skilled-unskilled wage inequality in the developing 
countries. They have also studied the consequences of an improvement of terms of trade 
and inflows of foreign capital on wage inequality with or without trade fragmentation. 
The paper finds that without trade fragmentation improvements in terms of trade and/or 
inflows of foreign capital may worsen wage inequality if the vertically integrated skilled 
export sector is more capital-intensive vis-à-vis the import-competing sector. But, with 
trade fragmentation the consequences on the relative wage inequality might be different.4 
However, in these papers all input markets have been assumed to be perfect and therefore 
labour market imperfection especially that of unskilled labour has not been taken care of. 
Further more, none of these papers takes into consideration the existence of non-traded 
                                                 
3 See Harrison and Hanson (1999), Hanson and Harrison (1999), Curie and Harrison (1997), and 
Beyer, Rojas and Vergara (1999) in this context. 
 
4 An inflow of foreign capital may worsen the wage inequality even with trade fragmentation if 
the traded intermediate good sector is capital-intensive relative to the import-competing sector. 
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goods and the nature of capital mobility between the traded and the non-traded sectors in 
analyzing the consequence of foreign capital inflows on the relative wage inequality. 
 
The existence of non-traded goods, the prices of which are determined domestically by 
demand-supply forces, is an essential feature of a developing economy. Liberalized 
economic policies are supposed to move resources away from the non-traded sectors to 
the traded sectors of the economy. The non-traded sectors usually use backward 
technologies of production and are intensive in the use of unskilled labour. Non-traded 
goods may be either inputs or final commodities. A non-traded sector that produces an 
intermediate good for a traded sector lives or dies with the latter. On the contrary, a final 
good-producing non-traded sector expands or contracts with an increase or a decrease in 
the purchasing power of the people who consume the commodity. Hence how the prices 
of non-traded goods change in response to policy changes plays a crucial role in 
determining the direction of relative wage movements. Furthermore, capital mobility 
between the traded and the non-traded sectors may be of different types. If the non-traded 
sector produces an agricultural commodity there should be capital mobility between the 
non-traded sector and the primary export sector while capital is likely to flow freely 
between the non-traded, low-skill manufacturing and the high-skill sectors if the non-
traded sector produces a manufacturing good. The outcomes of any policy changes on the 
relative wages should depend on the type of the non-traded good and the nature of capital 
mobility between the traded and the non-traded sectors.  
 
The present paper purports to address the above shortcomings of the existing theoretical 
literature on wage inequality in terms of two four-sector5 general equilibrium models 
reasonable for a developing economy. First, the case of non-traded input is taken up 
where one of the four sectors produces an intermediate good for another sector. Both 
these sectors use unskilled labour, and capital flows freely between them. There is also 
capital mobility between these sectors and the high-skill sector while in the latter skilled 
                                                 
5 One should ideally make use of a four-sector general equilibrium for capturing simultaneously 
both non-traded goods and imperfections in the market for unskilled labour. 
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labour is a specific input. We then deal with the case of final commodity where capital6 is 
mobile only between the primary export sector and the non-traded sector. These two 
sectors, however, cannot receive capital from/ lend capital to the other sectors i.e. the 
low-skill manufacturing sector and the high-skill sector. There is imperfection in the 
market for unskilled labour in the low-skill sector (formal sector) where unskilled 
workers receive a high unionized wage while their counterparts in the other two sectors 
receive only a low and competitive wage. The capital endowment of the economy 
consists of both domestic capital and foreign capital and these are perfect substitutes.7  
 
The consequences of foreign capital inflows on the skilled-unskilled wage inequality 
have been examined in these two alternative scenarios. The interesting results that 
emerge from the theoretical exercise are as follows. When the non-traded sector produces 
an intermediate input, inflows of foreign capital improve the wage inequality if the low-
skill manufacturing sector is capital-intensive (in a special sense) relative to the high-skill 
sector. On the contrary, relative wages may move against unskilled labour when the high-
skill sector is capital-intensive and the low-skill sector employs only a very small 
proportion of unskilled workforce. But, in the case of the non-traded final commodity 
wage inequality worsens (improves) if the low-skill sector (high-skill sector) is capital-
intensive and employs only a very small proportion of the unskilled workforce and if the 
primary export sector is unskilled labour-intensive. A wage subsidy policy and/or a 
capital subsidy policy should be undertaken under different circumstances so as to make 
wages move in favour of unskilled workers.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 These two sectors use land which is one type of capital in a wider sense.  To avoid confusion, 
however, we can call this input land-capital which is broadly conceived to include durable capital 
equipments of all kinds. See Bardhan (1973) and Chaudhuri (2007) in this context. 
 
7  This assumption has been widely used in the theoretical literature on foreign capital and 
welfare. See, Brecher-Alejandro (1977), Chanda and Khan (1993), Yabuuchi (1982) and 
Chaudhuri (2007) among others. 
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2. The model with non-traded intermediate input 
 
Let us consider a small open economy with four sectors. Sector 1 is the primary export 
sector that produces an agricultural commodity using unskilled labour and land-capital. 
The input ‘land-capital’ is broadly conceived to include durable capital equipments of all kinds.8 
Sector 2 produces a non-traded input for the low-skill manufacturing sector (sector 3) 
with the help of unskilled labour and capital. Sector 3, on the other hand, uses unskilled 
labour and capital apart from the non-traded input to produce a final manufacturing 
commodity. The per-unit requirement of the intermediate input, 23a , is assumed to be 
technologically fixed.9 Sector 3 is the import-competing sector of the economy. Finally, 
sector 4, another export sector, produces a high-skill product using skilled labour and 
capital. So land-capital and skilled labour are specific factors in sectors 1 and 4, 
respectively. Capital is perfectly mobile between the non-traded, low-skill and high-skill 
sectors. Unskilled workers employed in the low-skill sector (sector 3) earn a unionized 
wage, *W , while their counterparts in the other two sectors earn a competitive wage, 
W with .* WW >  Production functions exhibit constant returns to scale with diminishing 
marginal productivity to each factor. Perfect competition prevails in all markets, except 
the unskilled labour market in sector 3. The prices of the traded commodities are given by 
the small open economy assumption. But, the price of the non-traded input is determined 
                                                 
8 See footnote 6 in this context. 
 
9 It rules out the possibility of substitution between the non-traded input and other factors of 
production in sector 3. Although this is a simplifying assumption, it is not totally unrealistic. In 
industries like shoe making and garments, large formal sector firms farm out their production to 
small informal sector firms under the system of subcontracting. So the production is done in the 
informal sector while labeling, packaging and marketing are done by the formal sector firms. One 
pair of shoes produced in the informal sector does not change in quantity when it is marketed by 
the formal sector as a final commodity. It is also observed that that one car uses four tyres and 
one TV set requires one picture tube. Thus, there remains a fixed proportion between the use of 
the intermediate good and the quantity of the final commodity produced and marketed by the 
formal sector. On the other hand, if sector 2 produces an agricultural product like sugarcane or 
cotton, there might exist a fixed-proportion between the quantity of input used and the quantity of 
output produced in the sugar mills/textile firms.  It may be noted that papers like Chaudhuri 
(2003), Marjit (2003) and Chaudhuri, Yabuuchi and Mukhopadhyay (2006) have also made this 
assumption for different reasons.  
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domestically. The diverse trade pattern of the economy is reflected in the fact that it 
exports both the primary agricultural and the high-skill commodities while it is a net 
importer of the low-skill manufacturing commodity. A developing country which fits this 
type of comparative advantage is India.10 Commodity 1 is chosen as the numeraire. 
 
The following symbols will be used in the equations. 
 
=Kia capital-output ratio in the ith sector, i =  2,3,4; 
1Na = land capital-output ratio in sector 1; 
=Lia unskilled labour-output ratio in the ith sector, i =  1,2,3; 
=4Sa skilled labour-output ratio in sector 4; 
=iP internationally given price11 of the i th commodity, i  = 1,3,4; 
=2P domestically determined price of commodity 2; 
=iX level of output of the i th sector, i =  1,2,3,4; 
=SW wage rate of skilled labour; 
=*W institutionally determined (or unionized) unskilled wage rate in sector 3; 
=W competitive wage rate of unskilled labour; 
=R return to land-capital; 
=r  return to capital; 
=α,U parameters denoting the extent of bargaining power of the trade unions; 
=L  endowment of unskilled labour; 
=S  endowment of skilled labour; 
=N  endowment of land-capital; 
=K  endowment of capital of the economy (domestic plus foreign); 
                                                 
10  It may be mentioned that besides primary agricultural commodities, India is also a large 
exporter of high-skill products like computer software. However, one may also consider 
alternative trade patterns as results of this paper do not depend on the pattern of trade of the 
economy. 
 
11 Commodity 1 is chosen as the numeraire here. So, these are relative prices as well. 
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=jiθ distributive share of the j th input in the i th sector for =j KNSL ,,,  and =i  1, 2, 
3,4; 
=jiλ proportion of the j th input employed in the i th sector for =j KL, and =i 1,2,3,4; 
=+= *)( 31 WWW LLA λλ  average unskilled wage; 
k
jiS = the degree of substitution between factors j and i in the k th sector, 
KSNLij ,,,, = ; and, k = 1,2,3. For example, 
1
1 1( / )( / ),LN L LS R a a R≡ ∂ ∂ )/)(/( 111 WaaWS LLLL ∂∂≡ etc. 0>kjiS for ij ≠ ; and, ;0<kjjS  
=∧'' proportional change. 
 
 
Given the assumption of perfectly competitive markets the usual price-unit cost equality 
conditions relating to the four sectors of the economy are given by the following four 
equations, respectively. 
111 =+ NL RaWa                                                         (1) 
222 PraWa NL =+          (2) 
3 3 2 23 3*( , ) L KW W U a ra P a P+ + =         (3) 
444 PraaW KSS =+          (4) 
 
The formal sector faces a unionized labour market. The relationship for the unionized 
wage rate is specified as:12 
),(** UWWW = with WW =* for WWU >= *,0 for 0.U >  
whereU denotes the bargaining strength of the trade unions. This relationship states that 
in the absence of any bargaining power13 of the trade unions i.e. when ,0=U  the wage 
                                                 
12 Assuming that each formal sector firm has a separate trade union, the unionized wage function 
may be derived as a solution to the Nash bargaining game between the representative firm and the 
representative union in the formal sector. For detailed derivation see Chaudhuri (2003).  
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rates are equal in different sectors. However, the unionized wage rate in sector 3, *W , 
exceeds the competitive wage rate, W , when there is at least some power to the trade 
unions. The unionized wage is scaled upward as the competitive wage rate rises. Also 
with an increase in the bargaining power, the unions bargain for a higher wage.  
 
For the sake of analytical simplicity we consider the following specific algebraic form of 
the unionized wage function. 
WW α=* with 1>α .          (5) 
Hereα denotes the degree of imperfection in the market for unskilled labour. Higher the 
bargaining strength of the trade unions the higher would be the value ofα . 
 
Using (3), equation (5) can be rewritten as follows. 
333 PraWa KL =+α          (3.1) 
 
Full-employment conditions for unskilled labour, capital, land-capital and skilled labour 
are as follows, respectively. 
LXaXaXa LLL =++ 332211         (6) 
2 2 3 3 4 4K K Ka X a X a X K+ + =         (7) 
NXaN =11           (8) 
SXaS =44           (9) 
 
The output of sector 2, 2X , is used entirely for producing 3X , so that the supply of 2X is 
circumscribed by its total demand by sector 3. The demand – supply equality condition is 
given by 
2 23 3 2
DX a X X= =          (10) 
         
                                                                                                                                                 
13 The union power, denoted byU , is amenable to policy measures. If the government undertakes 
labour market reform measures e.g. partial or complete ban on resorting to strikes by the trade 
unions, reformation of employment security laws to curb union power, U takes a lower value.    
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There are nine endogenous variables in the system: 2 1 2 3, , , , , , ,SW W R r P X X X and 4X ; and, 
nine independent equations, namely, equations (1), (2), (3.1), (4) and (6) – (10). This is 
an indecomposable production system. Hence factor prices depend on both commodity 
prices and factor endowments. Using (8) and (9), equations (6) and (7) can be rewritten 
as follows, respectively. 
1 1 3 3( / )L N La N a a X L+ =?     
4 4 3 3( / )K S Ka S a a X K+ =?        (9.1) 
where 3 2 23 3L L La a a a= +?  and 3 2 23 3K K Ka a a a= +? . Note that 3La?  and 3Ka?  are the both direct 
and indirect uses of unskilled labour and capital in sector 3, respectively.  The indirect 
uses take place through the application of the non-traded input.  
 
The working of the general equilibrium model is as follows. The five input prices, 
, , ,SW W r R and 2P and 3X  are determined by solving equations (1), (2), (3.1), (4), (8.1) and 
(9.1) simultaneously. Once the factor prices are known the factor coefficients, jia s, are 
also known. 1X , 4X and 2X are obtained from equations (8), (9) and (10), respectively.  
 
Unskilled workers in this economy earn two different wages − either the unionized wage, 
*W , in sector 3 or the competitive wage,W , in sectors 1 and 2. The average wage for 
unskilled labour must be a weighted average of the two wage rates and is given by 
1 2 3( ( ) * )A L L LW W Wλ λ λ≡ + +  
and using (5) which can be rewritten as follows. 
3[1 ( 1) ]A LW W α λ= + −          (11)                                    
where Liλ denotes the proportion of unskilled labour employed in sector i , 1,2,3i = . In this 
case, the skilled−unskilled wage gap improves (worsens) in absolute terms if the gap 
between SW  and AW  falls (rises). On the other hand, the wage inequality improves 
(deteriorates) both in absolute and relative terms if .0)()ˆˆ( ><− AS WW  
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Differentiating equations (1), (2), (3.1), (4), (8.1) and (9.1) the following expression can 
be derived.14 
1 4 3 4 3
ˆˆ ˆ( ) ( )[( )( )S A N L K L S K
KW W θ λ θ θ θ θ− = −∆
? ?   
                    3 4 3
1 1
1{ ( 1)} )(
L S
K
A
LN NLL
W
W
S Sλ θ α θλ− − +? 1 22 3 ) }](N LLK LKS Sθ λ+ − , (12) 
where 3 2 23 3L L Lθ θ θ θ= +?  and 2 23 33 K KKθ θ θ θ= +? . The expression for∆ has been presented 
in Appendix I and it can be checked that  
 
0∆ >     (13) 
 
From (12) it is evident that ˆ ˆ( ) 0S AW W− < when ˆ 0K > if (i) 2 3LK LKS S≥ ; and, 
(ii) 4 4 3 3( / ) ( / )K S K Lθ θ θ θ< ? ? . On the contrary, ˆ ˆ( ) 0S AW W− > when ˆ 0K > if (i) 3 0;Lλ ≅ and, 
(ii) 4 4 3 3( / ) ( / )K S K Lθ θ θ θ> ? ? This establishes the following proposition. 
 
PROPOSITION 1: When the non-traded informal sector produces an input for the low-
skill manufacturing sector an inflow of foreign capital improves the skilled-unskilled 
wage inequality if (i) the vertically integrated low-skill formal sector is capital-intensive 
(in a special sense) 15 ; and, (ii) 2 3LK LKS S≥ . The relative wage inequality, however, 
deteriorates if the proportion of unskilled labour employed in the low-skill formal sector 
is significantly low and the high-skill sector is capital-intensive. 
 
                                                 
14 See Appendix I for detailed derivation of this expression. 
 
15 Here sectors 3 and 4 use two different types of labour. However, there is one intersectorally 
mobile input which is capital. So, these two industries cannot be classified in terms of factor 
intensities which is usually done in the Hechscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model. Despite this, a special 
type of factor intensity classification in terms of the relative distributive shares of the mobile 
factor i.e. capital may be used for analytical purposes. The industry in which this share is higher 
relative to the other may be considered as capital-intensive in a special sense. See Jones and 
Neary (1984) for details. 
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Proposition 1 can be intuitively explained as follows. As the system does not satisfy the 
decomposition property factor prices depend on both final commodity prices and factor 
endowments. An inflow of foreign capital lowers the return to capital, r , as the supply 
rises given the demand. All the three capital-using sectors expand. Sector 2 expands 
because sector 3 uses the output of the former as input in fixed proportion. The demand 
for skilled labour rises in sector 4 and that of unskilled labour increases in both sectors 2 
and 3. Consequently, SW  and W increase. An increase in W implies an increase in the 
unionized unskilled wage, *W . What happens to the average unskilled wage, AW , 
depends crucially on the change in the proportion of unskilled labour employed in the 
high wage-paying sector (sector 3) i.e. 3Lλ . As the ( * / )W r has increased producers in 
sector 3 would substitute unskilled-labour by capital. This lowers the labour-output ratio 
in sector 3, 3La . But, as sector 3 has expanded the aggregate employment of unskilled 
labour (and hence 3Lλ ) increases if 2 3LK LKS S≥ .16 Under this sufficient condition AW also 
rises. The outcome of foreign capital inflows on the skilled-unskilled wage inequality 
crucially depends on the rates of increase in SW and AW . Our analysis shows that if the 
vertically integrated low-skill manufacturing sector is capital-intensive relative to the 
high-skill sector relative wages move in favour of unskilled labour On the other hand, 
when the low-skill formal sector employs a very small proportion of the unskilled 
workforce17, an expansion of sector 3 cannot produce any significant positive effect on 
3Lλ and AW .The direction of relative wage movements now entirely depends on the rates 
of increases in the competitive unskilled wage and the skilled wage. Relative wages move 
against unskilled labour if the vertically integrated low-skill sector is less capital-
intensive vis-à-vis the high-skill sector. 
 
                                                 
16 See Appendix I. 
 
17 As per NSS estimates the proportion of workforce engaged in unorganized sector in 1999-2000 
in India was as high as 93 %. The unorganized sector, commonly known as the informal sector, 
comprises mainly of unskilled workers. Hence, the percentage of workforce engaged in the 
formal sector in 1999-2000 was quite low and this share is continuously declining over time with 
economic reforms. See Bhalotra (2002) in this context. 
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3. The modified system with non-traded final commodity 
 
In this section we propose to modify the model of section 2 in two directions. First, sector 
2 now produces a non-traded final commodity using unskilled labour and land-capital as 
two inputs. Thus, sectors 1 and 2 constitute a miniature HOS subsystem. Secondly, we 
introduce land-capital in the non-traded sector as well as in the primary export sector. 
Capital is perfectly flows freely between the low-skill manufacturing sector (sector 3) and 
the high-skill sector (sector 4). But, there is no capital mobility between the high-skill (or 
low-skill) sector and the non-traded sector. This setup fits well to developing countries 
that still have a dual structure with rural and urban areas. 
 
In addition to the symbols that we have used in section 2 we shall here use the following 
symbols as well. 
2Na =  land-capital-output ratio in sector 2; 
Y = national income at domestic prices18; 
DK = domestic capital stock; 
2D = demand for the non-traded final commodity; 
PE = own price elasticity of demand good 2; 
YE = income elasticity of demand for good 2. 
 
The usual zero-profit conditions for the four sectors are as follows. 
111 =+ NL RaWa          (14) 
222 PRaWa NL =+          (15) 
333 PraWa KL =+α          (16) 
444 PraaW KSS =+          (17) 
 
The demand for the non-traded final commodity is given by the following. 
2 2 2( , )D D P Y=           (18) 
                                                 
18 As there are no tariffs or subsidies national income at domestic prices and national income at 
world prices are the same in this model. 
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where,Y , is national income at domestic prices and is given by 
SWrKRNXaWWWLY SDL +++−+= 33)*(      (19)       
 
In equation (19), 3 3( ( * ) )LWL W W a X+ −  gives the aggregate wage income of the unskilled 
workers employed in the three sectors of the economy. RN is the rental income from 
land-capital while SW S is the wage income of skilled labour. Finally, DrK is the domestic 
capital income. Income from foreign capital is fully repatriated. 19  Hence, it is not 
included in equation (19).  
 
The demand for commodity 2 is a positive function ofY and a decreasing function of 2P . 
So we have: 2 2 2( / ) 0;( / ) 0D Y D P∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ < .   
 
The market for commodity 2 must clear domestically. So in equilibrium we have 
222 ),( XYPD =          (20) 
 
Full-employment conditions for resources are as follows. 
NXaXa NN =+ 2211          (21) 
LXaXaXa LLL =++ 332211         (22) 
KKKXaXa FDKK =+=+ 4433        (23) 
SXaS =44           (24) 
 
The modified model comprises of (11) equations (namely, equations (14) – (24)) and 
exactly the same number of endogenous variables; namely, 
2 1 2 3 4 2, , , , , , , , ,SW W R r P X X X X D andY . The four unknown factor prices are solved from 
equations (14) – (17) as functions of 2P . As jia  are functions of factor prices these are 
automatically obtained. Then from (21) – (24) iX s are found as functions of 2P . Finally, 
                                                 
19 This is the standard assumption made in the literature on foreign capital and welfare. See for 
example, Brecher and Alejandro (1977), Khan (1982) and Chau and Yu (1994). 
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using (19) 2P is solved from (20). Once 2P is obtained the values of all endogenous 
variables are obtained.   
 
The average unskilled wage is again given by 
])1(1[ 3LA WW λα −+=            (25)                               
 
Differentiating (14) – (17), (19) – (24) and (25) the following expression can be 
obtained20. 
1
4 3
ˆˆ ˆ( ) ( ) * [( )NS A K K
KW W θ λ θ θ− = − −Ω )]()1(
3
343 LKKSL S−−− θθλα  
                                                                                              3 3ˆ[ ( 1)( ) ]L
A
W X
W
λα− −     (26)       
 
where: ];)[(* 31131212 LNLNNL B λλλλλλλ +−=  and,      (27) 
.0])1)(/[( 3313 >−= XWaYEB LY α  
 
The expression forΩ has been presented in Appendix II and using the static stability 
condition in the market for the non-traded commodity21 it can be shown that in the stable 
equilibrium we must have:22 
0;Ω <  and, 3ˆ 0X >  when ˆ 0K >      (28) 
 
Note that relative factor intensity between sectors 1 and 2 
3 1 2 2 1, ( ),K N L N Lλ λ λ λ λ λ= − plays an extremely crucial role in determining the 
                                                 
20 See Appendices II, III and IV for mathematical derivation of this expression. 
 
21 The stability condition has been derived in Appendix V. 
 
22  Mathematical proofs of the two results have been provided in Appendices V and VI, 
respectively. 
 16
consequence of foreign capital inflows ( ˆ 0K > ) on the relative wage inequality, 
ˆ ˆ( )S AW W− . Out results are summarized in the following table.  
 
Table 1. The effects on wage inequality 
3 0Lλ >  0λ >  
(or 0λ < but * 0λ > ) 
 
3 4K Kθ θ≥  
 
3
4 3S K LKSθ θ ≥
(Inequality) 
Improves 
3 4K Kθ θ> .  Improves  
0λ >  
3 4K Kθ θ< .  Deteriorates 
3 4K Kθ θ< .  Improves 
 
 
3 0Lλ ≅   
0λ <  
3 4K Kθ θ> .  Deteriorates 
 
From the results one now establish the following proposition. 
 
PROPOSITION 2: When the non-traded sector produces an agricultural commodity and 
there is another common factor, land-capital, in the non-traded sector and the primary 
export sector, inflows of foreign capital are likely to improve the skilled-unskilled wage 
inequality if the low-skill manufacturing sector is capital-intensive and employs a 
significant proportion of the unskilled labour force. On the contrary, when the low-skill 
sector employs only a very small proportion of unskilled labour the wage inequality 
improves if the primary export sector is land-capital-intensive (or unskilled labour-
intensive) and the low-skill manufacturing sector (or high-skill sector) is capital-
intensive. The relative wage inequality, however, deteriorates provided the primary 
export sector is land-capital-intensive (or labour-intensive) and the high-skill sector (low-
skill sector) is capital-intensive. 
 
  
We explain proposition 2 in the following fashion. Here the non-traded sector and the 
primary export sector use the same two inputs− unskilled labour and land-capital, and 
together form a Hechscher-Ohlin Subsystem (HOSS). We have already stated that the 
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factor prices come out from the price system as functions of the price of the non-traded 
good, 2P , and that 2P  is determined by its demand and supply forces. Besides, an inflow of 
foreign capital leads to expansion of both sector 3 and sector 4. As sector 3 expands more 
(less) unskilled workers are now employed in the higher (lower) wage-paying sector 
(sectors). This raises the aggregate unskilled wage income. This we call the unskilled 
labour reallocation effect, which produces a positive effect on the aggregate factor 
income,Y  and raises the demand for the non-traded good (good 2). As sector 3 draws 
unskilled labour from the HOSS a Rybczynski type effect takes places that results in a 
contraction of the unskilled labour-intensive sector and an expansion of the other.  
 
If sector 1 is land-capital-intensive, it expands while sector 2 contracts. 2P  rises
23 as its 
supply has fallen while the demand has increased. This in turn produces a Stolper-
Samuelson effect in the HOSS and raises the competitive unskilled wage,W , as sector 2 
is labour-intensive. The unionized unskilled wage, *W , also rises. To satisfy the zero-
profit condition for sector 3 the return to capital, ,r falls. Saving on capital input raises the 
skilled wage, ,SW in sector 4. As producers in sector 3 substitute unskilled labour by 
capital, 3La falls. Despite this, the proportion of unskilled labour employed in the higher 
wage-paying sector 3 (i.e. 3Lλ ) rises if 33K LKSθ ≥ .24 We, therefore, find that the average 
unskilled wage increases due to (i) an increase inW ; (ii) an increase in *W ; and, due to 
(iii) an increase in the proportion of unskilled labour employed in the higher wage-paying 
sector if 33K LKSθ ≥ . Consequently, the average unskilled wage, AW , rises in this case under 
the sufficient condition as stated above. What happens to the skilled-unskilled wage 
inequality depends on the rates of increase in SW and AW . If )/)(()/( 2233 SKLK θθθθ => the 
saving on capital input in sector 3 is more  than (equal to) that in sector 4, which in turn, 
implies that the rate of increase of the unionized unskilled wage, *W , is greater than 
(equal to) that of the skilled wage, SW . But, there are two other factors working 
                                                 
23 See Appendix III. 
 
24 This has been shown in Appendix IV. 
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positively on the average unskilled wage. 25  Thus, the wage inequality gets better 
following inflows of foreign capital under the two sufficient conditions as mentioned 
above.  On the other hand, if the proportion of unskilled labour employed in the high 
wage-paying sector is considerably small (i.e. 3 0)Lλ ≅ , AW increases following an inflow 
of foreign capital as the competitive unskilled wage, ,W rises. If 3 4( )K Kθ θ> < saving on 
capital cost will be higher (lower) in the low-skill sector than that in the high-skill sector. 
Consequently, the wage inequality improves (worsens).  
 
If sector 1 (sector2) is unskilled labour-intensive (land-capital-intensive) the supply of the 
non-traded good rises following a Rybczynski type effect. The larger is the proportion of 
unskilled labour employed in the low-skill sector, the higher would be the magnitude of 
the Rybczynski type effect in the HOSS. Although both the demand and the supply of the 
non-traded good increase, the Rybczynski type effect of a sufficiently high magnitude 
(consequence of a high 3Lλ ) will make the expansionary supply side effect of the non-
traded good stronger than the demand side effect.  The price of the non-traded good, 2P , 
falls which in turn raisesW following the Stolper-Samuelson effect as sector 1 is now 
unskilled labour-intensive. The qualitative effects on 3*, , ,S LW r W λ and AW would exactly 
be the same as in the earlier case. Consequently, the skilled-unskilled wage inequality 
improves under the same set of sufficient conditions.  
 
Finally, if sector 1 (sector 2) is unskilled labour-intensive (land capital-intensive) but the 
proportion of the unskilled workforce employed in the low-skill sector is significantly 
low (i.e. 3 0)Lλ ≅ , the magnitude of the Rybczynski type effect in the HOSS would be 
very small and consequently the supply of good 2 rises only by a small magnitude. 
2P increases in this case as the demand side effect dominates over the supply side effect. 
The competitive unskilled wage,W , decreases following the Stolper-Samuelson effect as 
sector 2 is land-capital-intensive26. The return to capital rises despite an increase in the 
                                                 
25 These have already been discussed under (i) and (iii). 
 
26 The return to land-capital rises. 
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endowment of capital as sector 3 expands and the allocative share of capital in this sector 
is sufficiently high. Sector 4 contracts for want of capital27 and the skilled wage, ,SW falls 
as its demand falls. As 3 0Lλ ≅ , the average unskilled wage, AW , decreases as W falls. If 
4 3( )K Kθ θ> < increase on capital cost will be higher (lower) in the high-skill sector vis-à-
vis the low-skill sector. Consequently, the wage inequality improves (worsens).  
 
4. Policy implications and concluding remarks  
 
Growth in foreign direct investment, positively correlated with the relative demand for 
skilled labour, has been one of the prime factors responsible for widening of wage 
inequality in the Latin American countries like Mexico. But, foreign capital cannot be 
held accountable for the growing incidence of wage inequality in the developing 
economies in general. It is extremely important to judge the consequences of foreign 
capital in the light of the typical structural characteristics of these countries e.g. presence 
of non-traded goods, imperfections in the market for unskilled labour and type of 
intersectoral capital mobility. This has been done in this paper using two four-sector 
specific factors general equilibrium models.   
 
We have found that barring a few special cases inflows of foreign capital in general 
improve the wage inequality when the low-skill sector is capital-intensive. But, the 
relative wage gap may widen if the high-skill sector is capital-intensive. A capital subsidy 
policy to the low-skill manufacturing sector should be undertaken so as to increase the 
capital-intensity of production in this sector. On the other hand, when the non-traded 
sector produces a non-traded final commodity wage inequality worsens if the low-skill 
sector is capital-intensive and employs only a very small proportion of the unskilled 
workforce and if the primary export sector is unskilled labour-intensive. In such a case, 
the policy prescription should be to provide a wage subsidy to the low-skill sector. A 
wage subsidy would help in increasing the proportion of employment of unskilled labour 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
27 This has been shown in Appendix VII. 
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in the low-skill sector. This would also lend a hand in raising the competitive unskilled 
wage.  If these policies are followed whenever necessary abundant inflows of foreign 
capital might be a solution to deteriorating skilled-unskilled wage in the liberalized 
regime.    
 
 
Appendix I: 
 
Differentiating totally equations (1), (2), (3.1), (4) and (6) – (10) and arranging in a 
matrix notation one gets: 
 
1Lθ  1Nθ  0  0  0  0          Wˆ                     0  
2Lθ  0  2Kθ   0   1−   0         Rˆ                   0   
3Lθ  0  3Kθ  0  23θ  0           rˆ                     0  
0  0  4Kθ  4Sθ  0   0           ˆSW         =        0                 (A.1) 
1A−   2A   3A  0  0  Lλ         2ˆP                  0  
4A  0  5A−  6A   0   Kλ        3Xˆ                     Kˆ    
 
where: 
1
1 2 3 1
1 2 3 1 ) 0( LN LK LK NLL L L LA S S S Sλ λ λ λ+ + >= + ;   
2
1 1
1 ) 0( LN NLLA S Sλ >= + ; 3 2 32 3 ) 0( LK LKL LA S Sλ λ >= + ; 
4
2 3
2 3 ) 0( KL KLK KA S Sλ λ >= + ; 
5
2 3 4 4
2 3 4 4 ) 0( KL KLK K K KS K SKA S S S Sλ λ λ λ+ + >= + ;                                   (A.2) 
6
4 4
4 ) 0(K KS SKA S Sλ >= + ; 
2 3( ) 0L L Lλ λ λ= + > ; 2 3( ) 0K K Kλ λ λ= + > . 
 
and, 
1 4 2 23 2 3 1 4 23 2 3 1 4( ) [ ( )( )L S K K K N S K K K LA A Aθ θ λ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ λ λ∆ = + + + +  
                                               23 2 3 4 6 4 3 5( ){ ( )}] 0.L L K L S K LA A Aθ θ θ θ λ θ λ λ+ + + + >   (A.3) 
 21
As commodity 2 is internationally non-traded its market must clear domestically through 
adjustments in its price, 2P . The stability condition in the market for commodity 2 
requires that 
0)/)(( 222 <− dPXXd D . This implies around equilibrium, initially, 22 XX D = . Thus, 
2 2
ˆ ˆ(( / )DX P 2 2ˆ ˆ( / )) 0.X P− <  This requires that 0.∆ > In this case, of course, the stability 
condition is automatically satisfied. This is because from (A.2) and (A.3) it follows 
that∆ is unconditionally positive.                                                                                                           
 
Solving (A.1) by Cramer’s rule the following expressions are obtained. 
1 4 3
ˆ ˆ( ) /N S L KW Kθ θ λ θ= ∆?        (A.4) 
1 4 3
ˆ ˆ( ) /S N K L LW Kθ θ λ θ= ∆        (A.5) 
1 4 3
ˆˆ ( ) /N S L Lr Kθ θ λ θ= − ∆        (A.6) 
3 4 3 1 2 1 1 1 3 3
ˆ ˆ[ ( ) ) ] /S K L N N LX A A A Kθ θ θ θ θ θ= + + ∆? ?     (A.7) 
2 1 4 2 3 3 2
ˆ ˆ( )( ) /N S L L K L KP Kθ θ λ θ θ θ θ= − ∆       (A.8) 
 
where 3 2 23 3L L Lθ θ θ θ= +?  and 2 23 33 K KKθ θ θ θ= +? . Differentiating (11), using (A.4), (A.6) 
and (A.7) and simplifying one can derive the following expression. 
3 3 4 3
1 1
1
ˆ ˆˆ ( )[1 ( 1) ] ( 1) [ )(A L L S K
A A
LN NLL
WW W KW
W W
S Sα λ α λ θ θλ= + − + − ∆ +?  
                                                                 1 2
2 3 ) ](N LLK LKS Sθ λ+ −    (A.9) 
 
Using (A.2) and (A.3) from (A.4) – (A.9) the following results are obtained. 
When ˆ 0,K > (i) ˆ 0;W > (ii) ˆ 0;SW > (iii) ˆ 0;r < (iv) 3ˆ 0X > ; (v) ˆ 0AW > if 2 3LK LKS S≥ ; and, (vi) 
2ˆ 0P > (as 2 3 3 2L K L Kθ θ θ θ> i.e. sector 3 is more capital-intensive vis-à-vis sector 2 with 
respect to unskilled labour).  
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Appendix II: 
 
Total differentials of (14) – (17) yield the following expressions, respectively. 
0ˆˆ 11 =+ RW NL θθ            (A.10) 
0ˆˆˆ 222 =−+ PRW NL θθ         (A.11) 
0ˆˆ 33 =+ rW KL θθ          (A.12) 
0ˆˆ 44 =+ rW KSS θθ          (A.13) 
 
Using (24), equation (23) may be rewritten as follows. 
KaSaXa SKK =+ )/( 4433         (A.14) 
 
Differentiating totally equations (21), (22) and (23.1) one gets, respectively. 
0ˆˆˆˆ 221121 =++− XXRBWB NN λλ        (A.15) 
0ˆˆˆˆˆˆ 332211543 =+++++− XXXrBRBWB LLL λλλ      (A.16) 
KXWBrBWB KS ˆˆˆˆˆ 33876 =++− λ        (A.17) 
Also differentiating (19) and (20) one gets: 
0ˆˆˆˆˆˆˆˆ 313223131211109 =+−+++++ XBXPEXBrBrBRBWB P    (A.18) 
where: 
1 2
1 2 1 2( ) 0;N NL N NLB B S Sλ λ= = + >  
1 2 3
3 1 2 3( ) 0;L LN L LN L LKB S S Sλ λ λ= + + >  
1 2 3
4 1 2 5 3( ) 0; ( ) 0;L LN L LN L LKB S S B Sλ λ λ= + > = > 36 3( ) 0;K KLB Sλ= >  
;0))(;0))(( 4448
44
4
3
37 >+=>++= SKKSKSKKSKKLK SSBSSSB λλλ  
3
9 3 3( / )[ ( 1) (1 )];Y L LKB E W Y L a X Sα= + − − 10 ( / ) 0;YB E RN Y= >     (A.19) 
3
11 3 3( / )[ ( 1) ] 0;Y D L LKB E Y rK Wa X Sα= + − > 12 ( / ) 0;Y SB E W S Y= > and, 
.0])1)(/[( 3313 >−= XWaYEB LY α  
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Arranging (A.10) – (A.13), (A.15) – (A.17) and (A.18) in a matrix notation one gets the 
following. 
1Lθ  1Nθ  0  0  0  0  0  0      Wˆ     0  
 
2Lθ  2Nθ  0  0  1−  0  0  0      Rˆ     0  
 
3Lθ  0  3Kθ  0  0  0  0  0       rˆ     0  
 
0  0  4Kθ  4Sθ  0  0  0  0      SWˆ     0  
 
1B  2B−  0  0  0  1Nλ  2Nλ  0      2ˆP         =    0  (A.20) 
 
3B−  4B  5B  0  0  1Lλ  2Lλ  3Lλ      1Xˆ     0  
 
6B  0  7B−  8B  0  0  0  3Kλ      2Xˆ    Kˆ  
 
9B  10B  11B  12B  PE  0  1−  13B      3Xˆ     0  
 
where: 
9 1 3 4 10 1 3 4 11 1 3 4[( ) {( ) ( ) ( )P N K S L K S N L SE B B Bθ λ θ θ θ λ θ θ θ λ θ θ θ λΩ = − − − −              
       )( 43112 λθθθ KLNB+ )()( 7438436431121213 BBBB SLKLSKNLNNL θθθθθθθλλλλ ++−−    
                     ))(( 131631331431 BBB KLLNKNSKN λλλλλλθθθ ++−  
                 ))(())(( 3735431114121433 LKSLNNNLLSKK BBBB λλθθθλλλθθθλ +−+−  
                                                                                    )}]( 843131 BKLNLN θθθλλ−       (A.21) 
 
)( 212143 LNNLSK θθθθθθθ −= ; and,        (A.22) 
)( 12213 LNLNK λλλλλλ −=          (A.23) 
 24
So, we always have: 0.θ λ <        (A.24) 
 
Using the stability condition in the market for commodity 2 (see Appendix V) it can be 
shown that: 0.Ω <    
 
Appendix III: 
 
Solving (A.20) by Cramer’s rule the following expressions are obtained. 
1 3 4
ˆ ˆ( * / )N K SW Kθ θ θ λ= − Ω         (A.25) 
1 3 4
ˆ ˆ( * / )S N L KW Kθ θ θ λ= − Ω         (A.26) 
1 3 4
ˆˆ ( * / )N L Sr Kθ θ θ λ= Ω         (A.27) 
2 3 4 1 2 1 2
ˆ ˆ( * / )( )K S L N N LP Kθ θ λ θ θ θ θ= Ω −       (A.28) 
where: 2 1 2 1 13 1 3* [( ) ]L N N L N LBλ λ λ λ λ λ λ= − +        (A.29) 
             
3Xˆ also can be solved in the same manner. The final expression for 3Xˆ has been derived in 
Appendix VI. Using the stability condition in the market for commodity 2 it can be 
shown that: 3ˆ 0X > when ˆ 0K >  
 
From (A.25) – (A.28) the following results can be obtained. 
 
1. If sector 1 is more land-capital-intensive vis-à-vis sector 2 with respect to 
unskilled labour (i.e. , * 0; 0λ λ θ> < ) when ˆ 0K >  (i) 
ˆ 0;W > (ii) ˆ 0;SW > (iii) ˆ 0;r < (iv) 2ˆ 0.P >  
 
2. If sector 1 is more labour-intensive (but not sufficiently labour-intensive) than 
sector 2 (i.e. 0;λ < * , 0λ θ > ) when ˆ 0K >  (i) 
ˆ 0;W > (ii) ˆ 0;SW > (iii) ˆ 0;r < (iv) 2ˆ 0.P <  
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3. If sector 1 is sufficiently labour-intensive (i.e. , * 0;λ λ < 0θ > ) when ˆ 0K >  (i) 
ˆ 0;W < (ii) ˆ 0;SW < (iii) ˆ 0;r > (iv) 2ˆ 0.P >   
 
Appendix IV: 
 
Differentiating (25) one gets: 
3
3
3
33
3
ˆ))(1(ˆ))(1()]1()1(1)[
ˆ
(ˆ X
W
Wr
W
SWS
W
WWW
A
L
A
LKL
LKL
A
A
λαλαλα −+−+−−+=   
Using (A.25) and (A.27) the above expression may be simplified to  
3
1 4 3 3 3
ˆˆ ( )[( * ){( 1) ( ) }A N S L LK K K
A
WKW S
W
θ θ λ α λ θ θ= − − −Ω  
                                                                              3 3ˆ( ( 1) )L
A
W X
W
α λ+ −           (A.30) 
 
From (A.30) it is evident that 
 
1. When ˆ 0K > , ˆ 0AW > if (i) ( 0λ > and 3 0Lλ > ⇒ * 0)λ >  / ( 0λ < and 3 0Lλ >  
such that * 0)λ > ; and, (ii) 33 .K LKSθ ≥   
2. When ˆ 0K > , ˆ 0AW < if (i) 0λ <  and 3 0Lλ ≅ so that * 0λ < . 
  
Subtracting (A.30) from (A.26), using (A.25) and (A.27) and simplifying we get: 
1
2 1 2 1 13 1 3 4 3
ˆˆ ˆ( ) ( )[( ) ][( )NS A L N N L N L K K
KW W Bθ λ λ λ λ λ λ θ θ− = − − + −Ω  
)]()1( 3343 LKKSL S−−− θθλα                                                           
3 3
ˆ( 1) L
A
W X
W
α λ−−           (A.31) 
 
For the sake analytical convenience we rewrite (A.31) as follows. 
 
 26
1
4 3
ˆˆ ˆ( ) ( ) * [( )NS A K K
KW W θ λ θ θ− = − −Ω )]()1(
3
343 LKKSL S−−− θθλα  
                                                          3 3
ˆ( 1) L
A
W X
W
α λ−−    (26) 
The notation, *λ , has already been defined in (A.29). 
 
Appendix V: Stability condition of the market for commodity 2 
 
As commodity 2 is internationally non-traded its market must clear domestically through 
adjustments in its price, 2P . The stability condition of the market for commodity 2 
requires that 
0)/)(( 222 <− dPXDd . This implies around equilibrium, initially, 22 XD = . Thus, 
.0))ˆ/ˆ()ˆ/ˆ(( 2222 <− PXPD         (A.32)                                
 
Totally differentiating equations (14) – (17) and solving one can find out the following 
expressions. 
2 1 3 4
ˆ ˆ( / ) ( / )N K SW P θ θ θ θ= − ;        (A.33) 
2 1 3 4
ˆ ˆ( / ) ( / )L K SR P θ θ θ θ= ;        (A.34) 
2 1 3 4
ˆˆ( / ) ( / )N L Sr P θ θ θ θ= ;and,        (A.35) 
2 1 3 4
ˆ ˆ( / ) ( / )S N L KW P θ θ θ θ= − .        (A.36) 
 
Then differentiating equations (21) – (24), using (A.33) – (A.36), putting 0ˆ =K and 
solving by Cramer’s rule the following expressions may be obtained.  
2
2 1 3 3 1 3 6 1 3 1 1 3 4 1 4 1 2 3 3 4 1
ˆˆ ( )[( )( ) ( ) ( )N K N L L K N K S N L K K S L
PX B B B B Bλ λ λ λ λ λ θ θ θ λ λ λ θ θ θθ λ
−= + + + +  
                                          1 3 5 3 7 1 3 4 1 3 8 1 3 4( )( ) ]N K L N L S N L N L KB B Bλ λ λ θ θ θ λ λ θ θ θ+ + +  (A.37) 
2
3 2 1 1 2 3 6 3 7 3 8 1 4
ˆˆ ( )[( )( ) ]N L N L K L L N S
PX B B Bλ λ λ λ θ θ θ θ θλ θ= − − + +     (A.38) 
Differentiating equations (18) and (19) and considering 0ˆ =K  one can derive 
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2 2 9 10 11 12 13 3
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆP SD E P B W B R B r B W B X= + + + + +      (A.39)           
Using (A.33) – (A.36) and (A.38), equation (A.39) may be rewritten as follows. 
2 2 9 1 3 4 10 3 4 1 11 1 3 4 12 1 3 4
1ˆ ˆ( )[ ( ){P N K S K S L N L S N L KD P E B B B Bθ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θθ= − − − +  
                           13 1 2 2 1 1 3 4 6 3 4 7 3 4 8( / )( ) ( )}]N L N L N K S L S L SB B B Bλ λ λ λ λ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ− − + +  (A.40) 
 
Substituting the expressions for )ˆ/ˆ( 22 PD and )ˆ/ˆ( 22 PX from (A.40) and (A.37) into (A.32) 
and simplifying one obtains 
9 1 3 4 10 3 4 1 11 1 3 4 12 1 3 4
1[ ( ){ ( )P N K S K S L N L S N L KE B B B Bλ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θλ θ− − − +   
              13 1 1 2 2 1 3 4 6 3 4 7 3 4 8( )( )( )N N L N L K S L S L SB B B Bθ λ λ λ λ θ θ θ θ θ θ− − + +      
                1 3 4 1 3 3 1 3 6 1 3 1 3 3 4 1 1 4 1 2( )( ) ( )( )N K S N K N L L K K K S L N LB B B B Bθ θ θ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ θ θ θ λ λ− + + − +  
                          1 1 3 4 3 5 3 7 1 3 8 1 3 4( )( ) ( )}] 0N N L S K L N L N L KB B Bλ θ θ θ λ λ λ λ θ θ θ− + − <   (A.41)                 
 
Thus, the stability condition in the market for commodity 2 is given by (A.41). 
 
Using (A.24) and (A.41) from (A.21) it now trivially follows that 
0.Ω <            (A.42) 
 
Appendix VI: Derivation of expression for 3Xˆ  
 
Solving (A.20) we can find the following expression. 
3 3 4 1 9 1 10 1 3 4 12 4 11
3
ˆˆ ( )[ { ( ) ( )}P K S N L N L K S
K
KX E B B B Bθ λ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ λλ= − − − + −Ω                                      
        }])()({ 531114121311313134 BBBBB LNNNLLKLNKNKS θθλλλθθλλθθλθ +++++  (A.43) 
 
It may be noted that: 
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);/(; 33344 αθθ LLPS PWaXSW ==  
);( 444333 FKKD rKXPXPrK −+= θθ        (A.44) 
];)([)( 333121212211 XPXPRNWL LNNLLNLN θθθθθθθθ +−=−  
)()( 333444 XPrKrKSW KFSDSSK θθθθ −=−  
 
Inserting the values of iB s from (A.19), using (A.44) and simplifying it easily seen that 
)}()({ 114124311019143 BBBB SKLNLNSK θθθθθθθθ −+−  
             })()1(){( 22341
3
33341 XPrKSXaWY
E
FLSNLKKLSN
Y θθθθθαθθ −+−−=   (A.45)      
Using (A.45) and simplifying, from (A.43) the following expression can be easily 
obtained. 
2 2
3
3
ˆˆ ( )[ ( )YP
K
E P XKX E
Y
θ λλ= − +Ω      
                                       31 4 3 3 3 3
1( ){( ) ( ) }Y N S L K LK F
E P X S rK
Y
θ θ θ αλ θα
−− − +  
                4 3 1 3 1 3 1 1 1 3 1 2 1 4 1 1 3 5{ ( ) ( ) }]S K N K N L L K L N N N LB B B B Bθ λ θ θ λ λ θ θ λ λ λ θ θ+ + + + +  (A.46) 
 
Using (A.19) and (A.41) and comparing terms we can check that the sign of the square-
bracketed term in (A.46) is positive. As 0Ω < , from (A.46) it now follows that: 
3
ˆ 0X > when ˆ 0K > .   
    
Appendix VII: Derivation of expression for 4Xˆ  
 
Differentiating equation (24) one gets: 
4
4 4
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( )S SK SX a S W r= − = −         (A.47) 
Inserting the values of ˆSW and rˆ from (A.26) and (A.27) into (A.47) and simplifying the 
following expression is finally obtained. 
4
1 3
4
ˆ*ˆ ( )SK N L
S K
X
θ θ λ= − Ω         (A.48) 
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From (A.48) the following results can be stated. 
 
1. If sector 1 is land-capital-intensive/unskilled labour-intensive (but not sufficiently 
enough) (i.e. * 0λ > ), 4ˆ 0X > when ˆ 0K > . 
2. If sector 1 is sufficiently unskilled labour-intensive (i.e. * 0λ < ), 4ˆ 0X < when 
ˆ 0K > .  
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